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The experiment examined how salience of out-group membership affects an 
individual's tendency to financially exploit an out-group member in a prisoner's 
dilemma (PD) game and a monetary bonus allocation task. It also examined the 
role of depersonalization of self and others. Half of the research participants played 
a PD game to win money with an imaginary opponent, who had a foreign accent, 
and the other half did with an opponent, who spoke fluent English. A salient 
indication of out-group membership was present in the former (accent) condition, 
and it was absent in the latter (control). Participants were also asked to allocate 
bonus money between the opponent and themselves. It was expected that: 1) 
participants in the accent condition would be more likely to depersonalize self and 
others than participants in the control condition; and 2) that participants who 
showed a higher level of depersonalization would make more competitive 
responses in the PD game and allocate more money to themselves than those who 
showed a lower level of depersonalization. The results confirmed the first 
hypothesis, but only a part of the second hypothesis. The level of depersonalization 
of self and others predicted the nature of the PD game responses, but not bonus 
money allocation. Unexpectedly, when the effect of depersonalization was 
collapsed, the presence of the accent produced a higher level of cooperation in the 
PD game. 
Economic inequality has always existed in 
nations across the globe, rich and poor, never 
vanishing despite some effort and improvement 
over the last fifty years (Todaro & Smith, 2003). 
In reality, as social groups compete over limited 
resources, certain dominant social groups often 
enjoy more favorable resource allocations than 
the rest. The present study intended to 
demonstrate that financial exploitation of out- 
group members in a situation where individuals 
are inclined to obtain a high reward is more 
likely to occur as an out-group membership cue 
is highly available. Also, it intended to 
understand underlying psychological processes 
and specifically investigated a role of 




Prior research indicates that individuals tend 
to favor their own group (i.e. in-group) when 
allocating rewards in an inter-group setting even 
when such groups tend to be temporary and 
arbitrary in nature (Brewer & Silver, 1978; 
Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). Tajfel et 
al. (1971) designed a particular setting called the 
minimal group paradigm according to the 
following criteria: 1) no face-to-face interaction 
takes place among participants within and 
between groups, 2) a group member is kept 
anonymous, 3) there is "no instrumental or 
rational link between the criteria for inter-group 
categorization and the nature of ingroup and 
outgroup responses" (p. 154), and 4) responses 
measured do not represent any utilitarian values 
to participants. Tajfel et al. (1971) randomly 
divided subjects into groups according to an 
"over-estimate" and an "under-estimate" (p. 155) 
of dots projected on the screen, or "preferences 
between paintings of 'two foreign modern 
painters, Klee and Kandinsky"' (p. 165). 
According to the "multiple-choice allocation 
matrices" (Brewer, 1979, p. 310) adapted by 
Tajfel et al. (1971), participants favored a choice 
that maximized payoffs for the in-group over the 
choice that maximized payoffs for both groups. 
Moreover, these participants were most likely to 
attempt to maximize the difference in payoffs 
between the in-group and the out-group (i.e. 
"relative gain"). Brewer and Silver (1978) 
pointed out that some choice alternatives that 
maximized "relative gain" were confounded with 
"absolute (in-group) gain" (Brewer, 1979, 
p. 310) in the matrix adapted by Tajfel et al., and 
used their "forced-choice allocation matrices" 
(Brewer, 1979, p. 311), which eliminated the 
confound. They randomly divided subjects into 
groups following an "aesthetic preference test" 
(Brewer & Silver, 1978, p. 394), and confirmed 
that even when other alternatives were 
simultaneously available, individuals dominantly 
chose point allocations that maximized "relative 
gain" in favor of their own group (i.e. in-group) 
over absolute in-group gain, equal gain, or joint 
gain between the in-group and the out-group. 
In-group favoritism observed in the minimum 
group paradigm has been explained by social 
identity theory (Turner, 1985). According to the 
theory, an individual's self-concept is 
constructed by both personal identity as a unique 
individual and social identity as a certain group 
member. In order to enhance one's own social 
identity, individuals often adopt categorization of 
people into groups and are motivated to 
differentiate their own groups from the other 
groups in favor of their own groups by social 
comparison (Brewer, 1979; Turner, 1985; 
Yamagishi et al., 2005). Particularly in the 
minimal group paradigm, where allocation of 
payoffs in a given matrix is the only means 
available for social comparison among different 
groups, individuals actively seek to differentiate 
their in-group from the out-group by maximizing 
"relative gain" in favor of the in-group 
(Yamagishi et al., 2005). 
Salience of Categorization 
Brewer (1979) reviewed various experimental 
studies, which reported in-group favoritism 
between groups arbitrarily created in a 
laboratory, and concluded that salience of inter-
group categorization ultimately determines the 
level of in-group favoritism. A few other factors 
such as interdependence (e.g. inter-group 
competition), similarity between groups, and 
difference in status of groups, indirectly 
influence in-group favoritism by affecting 
salience of inter-group categorization and the 
distinction between the in-group and the out-
group (Brewer, 1979). For instance, Turner 
(1985) found that the order in which two 
different allocation tasks in the Tajfel et al. 
allocation matrix were performed affected the 
level of self-favoritism by influencing salience of 
inter-group categorization. Participants who first 
allocated payoffs between self and another 
participant showed moderate favoritism toward 
self whether another participant was an in-group 
member or not. On the other hand, participants 
who first allocated payoffs between two other 
participants, another in-group member and an 
out-group member, and then allocated payoffs 
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between self and another participant showed 
significantly higher self-favoritism when another 
participant was an out-group member than an in-
group member. By performing the first allocation 
task, the inter-group distinction was made more 
salient for the latter participants, which led to an 
increase in their in-group favoritism (Brewer, 
1979; Turner, 1985). 
Kramer (1991) proposed a "general model of 
inter-group relations in organizations" (p. 213) 
by summarizing findings of many studies, which 
showed that inter-group categorization increases 
competitive responses among individuals in 
interdependent resource allocation (e.g. Kramer 
& Brewer, 1984). According to the model, 
salience of inter-group categorization influences 
perceived interdependence in terms of resource 
scarcities by affecting individuals' motives, 
perceptions and expectations, and the perceived 
interdependence will directly determine 
individuals' decisions to behave cooperatively or 
competitively with out-group members. 
Salience of Out-group Membership and 
Depersonalization 
The present study manipulated presence or 
absence of out-group membership in terms of a 
social enduring category such as nationality. 
Instead of being explicitly told that they were 
belonging to a certain group as in many 
minimum group paradigm studies, participants 
played a prisoner's-dilemma (PD) money 
winning game with an imaginary opponent, who 
happened to have a foreign (Japanese) accent or 
not. In the accent condition, it was apparent to 
the participants who were the U.S. natives that 
their opponent belonged to a different group (i.e. 
out-group) in terms of nationality. In the non-
accent (control) condition, on the other hand, the 
manifest out-group membership cue was absent. 
It was expected that the presence of salient out-
group membership would produce greater 
perceived inter-group categorization, which 
would lead individuals to depersonalize self and 
others. According to Turner's self-categorization 
theory (1987), depersonalization is a perception 
of self and others based on group memberships  
instead of each individual (Postmes, Spears, & 
Lea, 2002; Turner, 1987; Van Prooijen & Van 
Knippenberg, 2000). When an individual 
depersonalizes self and others relying on group 
memberships, he or she views self and others 
more as group members and less as unique 
individuals. As a consequence, perceived 
interpersonal differences within his or her own 
group (i.e. in-group) and within the relevant out-
group will both diminish, and perceived 
similarities between self and in-group members 
and perceived differences between self and out-
group members will both increase (Postmes et 
al., 2002; Turner, 1987;Van Prooijen & Van 
Knippenberg, 2000). Postmes et al. (2002) 
manipulated depersonalization in terms of 
anonymity and found that depersonalized 
interaction in non-face-to-face computer 
communication as opposed to individuated 
interaction increased perceived inter-group 
differentiation and group stereotypes. As we 
have seen, it has been frequently argued that 
salience of inter-group categorization directly 
(e.g. Brewer, 1979) or indirectly (e.g. Kramer, 
1991) affects in-group favoritism. However, 
there is little research directly linking 
depersonalization of self and others to in-group 
favoritism in terms of financial exploitation of 
out-group members. We investigated if 
depersonalization of self and others would lead 
individuals to act more competitively toward 
out-group members in interdependent resource 
allocation such as a prisoner's-dilemma game. 
Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game 
In a typical PD game matrix, incentives to 
"compete" or "cooperate" coexist among both 
players (Besanko & Braeutigam, 2002, p.610-
612). When presented with a matrix, two players 
make decisions independently and 
simultaneously, and each decision affects 
outcomes of payoffs awarded to each player. The 
dilemma is that although to "compete" has some 
short term benefits, in the long term, the 
collective profit of both players will be 
maximized if both choose to "cooperate" across 
trials. Through repeated number of trials, it is 
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possible for both players to continue being 
cooperative over time and establish a higher 
likelihood of a cooperative outcome (Besanko & 
Braeutigam, 2002). Nevertheless, an incentive to 
compete would never be zero. In extremity, 
Axelrod (1990) explains no incentives to 
cooperate will emerge among two egoist players 
without a central authority until they play the PD 
game an "indefinite unknown number of 
times"(p. 294-314). In the present experiment, 
due to the time constraint of the experiment, 
participants made a response to the PD money 
winning game for a single trial. Since the history 
of each player's responses in the past trials is 
crucial in order to establish a base level of trust, 
all participants were asked to imagine that they 
had been playing the PD game with a given 
individual for six trials and that they had made 
cooperative responses on the last four trials. 
Then they were asked to make a response for the 
seventh, final trial. Since the participants' 
decisions were made within a limited number of 
trials in the hypothetical setting, an incentive to 
compete for the trial was expected to be at least 
larger than zero. 
Alternative Theory: Group Heuristic? 
Yamagishi and his colleagues proposed a 
"group heuristic" or a "naïve theory of groups" 
(Jin & Yamagishi, 1997; Jin, Yamagishi, & 
Kiyonari, 1996; Karp, Jin, Yamagishi, & 
Shinotsuka, 1993; Kiyonari, 2000; Yamagishi, 
Jin, & Kiyonari, 1999; Yamagishi, Jin, & Miller, 
1998; Yamagishi & Kiyonari, 2000; Yamagishi et 
al., 2005, p. 174) as an alternative explanation 
for in-group favoritism in the minimal group 
paradigm. According to them, the "group 
heuristic" represents "a set of beliefs or 
expectations that in-group relations will be 
cooperative, friendly, truthful, and peaceful" 
(Yamagishi et al., 2005, p. 175), and their theory 
suggests that individuals behave favorably 
toward their own group (i.e. in-group) members 
only when such beliefs or expectations are 
mutually shared between the interacting parties. 
Yamagishi et al. (2005) added that the "general 
heuristic applies also to one's own behavior  
towards other group members" (p. 175) based on 
the existence of a "schema of an out-group----
learned beliefs or expectations that inter-group 
relations are competitive, unfriendly, deceitful, 
and aggressive" (p. 175). Yamagishi et al. (2005) 
manipulated presence or absence of mutual 
knowledge of group identity between a 
participant and his or her opponent in a PD 
game. In the "mutual knowledge condition" (p. 
178), both a participant and his or her opponent 
knew whether they belonged to the same group 
or different groups in terms of nationality 
(Japanese or Australian), while one participant 
knew it but his or her opponent did not in the 
"unilateral knowledge condition" (p. 178). Both 
Japanese and Australian participants were 
employed, and for Japanese participants, 
Japanese participants were in-group members 
and Australians were out-group members and 
vice versa for Australian participants. Every 
participant played a PD game with five different 
opponents, and two of the five opponents were 
in-group members, while other two were out-
group members. A participant had "mutual 
knowledge" with one of the two group members 
(in the in-group or the out-group respectively) 
and "unilateral knowledge" with the other one of 
the group members. Nationality of one opponent 
was not known to participants. The PD game 
used in their experiment did not involve a 
standard payoff matrix such as in the present 
study. Instead, a participant was asked to 
determine how much of the initial endowment 
(AUD 1.00 or 100 yen) he or she would give to 
the opponent. The amount of money that a 
participant decided to give to the opponent 
would be doubled and given to the opponent and 
similarly, the amount of money that the opponent 
offered would be doubled and given to the 
participant. The level of cooperation for each 
trial was measured with the amount of money 
that a participant gave to the opponent. 
Yamagishi et al. (2005) found that the "mutual 
knowledge" produced significantly higher levels 
of cooperation among both Australian and 
Japanese participants than the "unilateral 
knowledge" when the opponent was an in-group 
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member, but the knowledge manipulation 
exerted no effects when the opponent was an 
out-group member. The findings confirmed their 
hypotheses and demonstrated that the "group 
heuristic" accounted for in-group relations 
beyond the minimum group setting. 
Nevertheless, it is unclear why their theory was 
not applied to inter-group relations, that is, 
individuals' behavior toward out-group 
members, in their hypotheses and the results. It is 
contradictory to their earlier notion on the 
existence of "schema of an out-group," which 
should be reflected in individuals' behavior in 
the inter-group interaction. 
The present study did not intend to test the 
"group heuristic" theory, and all participants 
played a PD game with a given individual 'Kim' 
in a hypothetical setting. A salient indication of 
out-group membership of 'Kim' in terms of 
nationality was present or absent depending on 
the accent conditions, and "mutual knowledge" 
of group membership between a participant and 
`Kim' was absent in the two accent conditions. 
Also, the standard payoff matrix was used for the 
PD game, and the history of their responses in 
the past trials was told to participants in order to 
control the base level of trust. 
Hypotheses 
The present study aimed to demonstrate that 
the more salient out-group membership was, the 
more likely individuals would be to exploit an 
out-group member in a PD money winning game 
and monetary bonus allocation. In addition, it 
aimed to examine whether depersonalization of 
self and others would mediate the effects. In 
other words, it was expected that salient out-
group membership would lead to more 
depersonalization, which would lead to monetary 
exploitation of an out-group member. Therefore, 
it was hypothesized that: 1) participants in the 
accent condition would show greater 
depersonalization than participants in the non-
accent (control) condition, that 2) participants 
who exhibited higher scores of depersonalization 
would be more likely to choose a competitive 
response (as opposed to a cooperative response)  
in a PD game played with an out-group member 
and allocate less of earned monetary bonus to her 
than participants who exhibited lower scores of 
depersonalization, and that 3) when 
depersonalization scores were controlled, no 
differences in individuals' responses to the PD 
game and the reward allocation would be 




Participants were 99 Introductory Psychology 
students at the University of Iowa (43 men and 
56 women) who participated in the experiment 
as one means of fulfilling a course requirement. 
Among them, 50 participants (20 men and 30 
women) were assigned to the accent condition 
and 49 participants (23 men and 26 women) 
were assigned to the control condition. 
Procedure 
Each participant faced a computer equipped 
with headphones and the entire experiment was 
carried out by a computer program. Participants 
were randomly assigned to two conditions: 
accent or non-accent (control). The experiment 
was introduced as following: 
This experiment concerns how your 
knowledge about other persons' opinions and 
personality affects your way of interacting 
with them. You will obtain some information 
about a few people and then we will have 
you try and report how you would interact 
with them in a risk-game setting. This 
experiment uses a role-play technique, that 
is, we will have you imagine how you would 
react to certain of these other people in a 
certain setting. 
1. Manipulation of out-group membership 
presence 
In the experiment, participants first listened to 
four females (named `Anne,' Kim,"Sue,' and 
`Lynn') exchange their opinions about premarital 
sex in an audio taped discussion. The audio 
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discussion was introduced to participants as 
following: 
In order to give you some idea of opinions 
and personalities of others, we would like 
you to listen to a discussion held by four 
female students. You can assume they are 
all from the University of Iowa. They will 
be exchanging their opinions about dating, 
romance and sex. The names of the four 
students are Anne, Kim, Sue, and Lynn. 
Each person will start talking after 
indicating her name each time, so please 
pay attention to who is speaking as well as 
what the person is saying. The discussion 
will be played only once, so please listen 
carefully. Later, you will be asked to 
imagine how you would react when 
interacting with one of these women. 
In the beginning of the audio discussion, each 
of the four females briefly introduced their name 
and background, such as where they were from. 
`Anne' mentioned that she was from Iowa City, 
while 'Lynn' mentioned that she was originally 
from California and moved to Iowa City a few 
years ago. 'Kim' and 'Sue' mentioned that they 
had experience living abroad until they moved to 
Iowa a few years ago. Following the 
introduction, the script was written in a way 
where two females, 'Anne' and 'Lynn,' 
expressed liberal attitudes toward premarital sex 
(e.g. "...individuals' freedom to express love and 
passion so long as they accept the responsibility 
for their choice should be more permitted."), 
while the other two females, `Kim' and `Sue,' 
expressed conservative views (e.g. "Having sex 
with numerous partners will create a great risk to 
young people's health and future..."). Assuming 
that the majority of students at the University of 
Iowa possessed liberal attitudes toward 
premarital sex, it was expected that `Anne' and 
`Lynn' would be perceived by participants as 
relatively more similar to themselves than `Kim' 
and 'Sue.' The exact same script was used in the 
two accent conditions and thus, the extent of the 
different attitudes toward premarital sex 
expressed by the four females was held constant  
across conditions. Presence or absence of salient 
out-group membership in terms of nationality 
was manipulated by accented English. In the 
accent condition, 'Kim' and `Sue' spoke with an 
Asian (Japanese) accent, while `Anne' and 
`Lynn' spoke fluent English. In the non-accent or 
control condition, all four females spoke fluent 
English. In other words, given that the majority 
of participants consisted of Caucasian U.S. 
natives, salient out-group membership of `Kim' 
and 'Sue' was present in the accent condition, 
while it was absent in the control condition. 
Ideally, the part of 'Kim' and 'Sue' in the script 
could have been read by the same individuals so 
was the part of `Anne' and `Lynn.' However, 
artificiality of an accent would have caused a 
great concern in the case, and therefore, two 
American women read the part of `Kim' and 
`Sue' for the control condition in the recording, 
while two Japanese women read them for the 
accent condition. Two other American women 
read 'Anne' and 'Lynn' and the exact same audio 
recorded for their part was used for both 
conditions. 
2. Dependent measurement: PD game and bonus 
money allocation 
After hearing the audio-discussion, 
participants played a PD money winning game 
with `Kim,' one of the four females they listened 
to, in a hypothetical setting, and they were asked 
to imagine the following situation: 
You are about to participate in a game with 
one other person. This person will be one 
of the women from the discussion you just 
listened to. In this game, assume you have a 
chance to win a substantial amount of 
money. In this vein, your goal is to win as  
much money as you can. The person who 
you will play the game with will be 
randomly selected out of the four female 
students in the discussion you just heard. 
Although participants were told that their 
opponent for the PD game would be randomly 
selected among the four females, all 
participants actually played the game with 
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`Kim.' Next, participants heard a short 
introduction spoken by 'Kim.' 
So you will get a better feel of this game, 
you will hear a short introduction from the 
person you will be playing with. 
(`Kina' spoke,) "Hi I am Kim. I am a 
student here at the University of Iowa. I am 
from Des Moines. My family has lived 
there for about five years. Before that, we 
lived abroad." 
In the accent condition, this part was 
intended to remind the participants of the accent 
of 'Kim.' Following the introduction, the rules 
of the PD money winning game were explained: 
In this money-winning game, both you and 
Kim will be choosing between two options, 
A and B. Each option awards a certain 
amount of money to you and to Kim. 
However, the exact amount of money you 
will get depends on Kim's choice as well as 
your own. At the same time, the exact 
amount of money Kim will get depends on 
your choice as well as hers. The amount of 
money awarded to each of you according to 
the responses you and Kim will make is 
determined as following: 
If you choose A and Kim chooses A, you 
will get $100 and Kim will get $100. 
If you choose A and Kim chooses B, you 
will get $10 and Kim will get $500. 
If you choose B and Kim chooses A, you 
will get $500 and Kim will get $10. 
If you choose B and Kim chooses B, you 
will get $15 and Kim will get $15. 
The choice matrix, which summarized the 
combination of the responses and the amount of 
money awarded to a participant and 'Kim' as in 
Figure 1, was shown to participants. Each 
participant was told to imagine that he or she and 
`Kim' were facing the same choice matrix and 
assume that they could not talk with each other 
before making any response. Furthermore, they 
were asked to imagine that they had already 
played the game with 'Kim' six times and largely 
made cooperative responses (the response A).  
The information on the past trials was given to 
the participants to establish the baseline control 
of trust among the two players: 
Please also imagine Kim and you already 
have been playing this game six times. In 
the first two trials, both of you chose B, 
and therefore you two earned $15 
respectively, which is indicated by the line-
shaded cell (the right at the bottom) in the 
matrix below (see Figure 2). On the last 
four trials, both of you chose A, and 
therefore you two earned $100 respectively, 
which is indicated by the dot-shaded cell 
(the left at the top) in the matrix (also see 
Figure 2). 
The participants were asked to make a response 
A or B for the seventh trial in the hypothetical 
setting: 
And this is the seventh and final trial of 
the game. Your goal is to win as much 
money as you can. Please choose your 
response A or B. 
The PD game response "A" was coded as 
"cooperative = 1" and the response "B" was 
coded as "competitive = 2" as a first dependent 
variable. 
After participants made their responses to the 
PD game, they were further instructed to imagine 
the following hypothetical situation, where they 
received bonus money worth U.S. $100 and had 
the right to allocate it between self and 'Kim.' 
After playing multiple rounds of the 
previous game, you have earned $945 U.S. 
dollars and Kim has earned $845 U.S. 
dollars. The experimenter comes in and 
announces that you and Kim have earned 
$100 bonus dollars based on your collective 
earnings. Because you earned more than 
Kim, you get to decide how this $100 will 
be distributed between Kim and yourself. 
The choice matrix that depicted eleven possible 
allocations of the money (see Figure 3) was 
shown to participants and they were asked to 
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choose the amount of money they would want to 
allocate to themselves: 
Eleven possible monetary distributions of 
the $100 bonus dollars between Kim and 
yourself in this hypothetical situation are 
shown (in Figure 3). The amount of money 
each of you will get is shown from the left 
to the right. The amount of money Kim will 
get is shown in a row at the top, and the 
amount of money you will get is shown at 
the bottom. For example, when Kim gets 
$100 you will get $0 (the far left option), 
and when she gets $0 you will get $100 (the 
far right option). 
To distribute the money between Kim and 
yourself, please choose one option. Please 
click on one of the icons below, which 
indicates a monetary distribution. 
The amount of money the participants chose to 
allocate to themselves was recorded as a second 
dependent variable. 
3. Depersonalization measurement 
Depersonalization of self and others was 
measured in the end of the experiment. 
1) Depersonalization of others 
First, the level of depersonalization of others, 
i.e. the extent to which participants 
depersonalized the four females in the audio 
discussion, was measured by (a) implicit 
(Postmes et al., 2002; Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, & 
Ruderman, 1978) and (b) explicit (Van Prooijen 
& Van Knippenberg, 2000) measurement. 
a) Implicit measurement: Who said what 
Following the bonus money allocation task, 
participants were given a recall test called "who 
said what" (Taylor et al. as cited in Postmes et 
al., 2002, p. 11). Twenty statements from the 
audio discussion that was heard in the beginning 
of the experiment were shown to participants in 
a randomized order. Participants were asked to 
identify who said each statement among the four 
females, `Anne,' Kim,"Sue,' or 'Lynn.' They 
were instructed to guess if they were uncertain.  
The twenty statements consisted of five 
statements spoken by each one of the four 
females. In the audio taped discussion about 
dating, romance, and sex, two females (`Anne' 
and 'Lynn') represented liberal opinions about 
premarital sex, while the other two females 
(`Kini' and `Sue'), who had an accent in the 
accent condition, represented more conservative 
views. If participants depersonalized the four 
females, they would process information 
according to group-based categories. As a 
consequence, intra-group recall errors or 
confusion within a group would increase relative 
to inter-group recall errors or confusion between 
groups (Postmes et al., 2002; Taylor et al., 1978). 
Specifically, they would show more confusion to 
recall "who said what" between 'Anne' and 
`Lynn' or between 'Sue' and 'Kim,' if they 
processed information in a depersonalized 
manner. The depersonalization score was defined 
as a percentage of intra-group recall errors in 
total errors that were made by each participant. 
b) Explicit measurement: Intra-group 
variability 
When an individual depersonalized others, 
perceived "intra-group variability" would 
decrease (Postmes et al., 2002; Turner, 1987; Van 
Prooijen & Van Knippenberg, 2000, p. 70). In 
other words, perceived similarity within a group 
or between the same group members would 
increase, while perceived similarity between 
groups or different group members would 
decrease. Thus, intra-group variability was 
measured in terms of perceived similarity and 
difference between two females among the four 
(Anne, Kim, Sue, and Lynn). Perceived 
similarity was measured with the question "To 
what extent do you anticipate (e.g. Anne and 
Kim) will be similar in terms of most of their 
general social attitudes?" Perceived difference 
was measured with the question "To what extent 
do you anticipate (e.g. Anne and Kim) will be 
different in terms of most of their general social 
attitudes?" Both types of questions had a 7-point 
scale that ranged from 1= not at all to 7= very 
much (cf. Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995; 
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Simon, Hastedt, & Aufderheide, 1997; Van 
Prooijen & Van Knippenberg, 2000). 
i) Perceived similarity within a group. It was 
measured with the perceived similarity and 
difference questions regarding the two pairs of 
individuals, who belonged to the same group: 
{Anne and Lynn} and {Kim and Sue} . Perceived 
similarity scores, which were first combined 
(averaged) with reversed perceived difference 
scores for each of the pairs, were averaged 
altogether. 
ii) Perceived similarity between groups. It 
was measured with the perceived similarity and 
difference questions regarding the other four 
pairs of individuals, who belonged to different 
groups: {Anne and Kim}, {Anne and Sue}, 
{Kim and Lynn}, and {Sue and Lynn} . Scores 
were computed by the same method as perceived 
similarity within a group. 
2) Depersonalization of self 
Second, the level of depersonalization of self 
was measured with explicit measurement (Van 
Prooijen & Van Knippenberg, 2000). If an 
individual depersonalized self, perceived 
similarity between self and an in-group 
member(s) and perceived dissimilarity between 
self and an out-group member(s) would increase 
(Postmes et al., 2002; Turner, 1987; Van Prooijen 
& Van Knippenberg, 2000). Perceived similarity 
between self and one of the four females in the 
audio-discussion was measured with two types 
of questions that had 7-point scales as previous 
questions: "I expect I will be different from (e.g. 
Anne) in terms of most of general social 
attitudes" (reverse scored); and "I expect I will 
resemble (e.g. Anne) in terms of most of general 
social attitudes." (cf. Simon, Pantaleo, & 
Mummendey, 1995; Van Prooijen & Van 
Knippenberg, 2000). 
i) Perceived similarity between self and in-
group members (`nne' and 'Lynn). Perceived 
similarity scores between self and 'Anne' and 
between self and 'Lynn' were first combined 
(averaged) with reversed perceived difference 
scores respectively, and then averaged altogether  
as a perceived similarity score between self and 
in-group members for each participant. 
ii) Perceived similarity between self and out-
group members ( `ICim' and `Sue). Similarly, 
perceived similarity scores between self and 
`Kim' and between self and 'Sue' were first 
combined (averaged) with reversed perceived 
difference scores respectively, and then averaged 
altogether as a perceived similarity score 
between self and out-group members. 
Following the depersonalization 
measurement, participants answered the question 
regarding each one of the four females, "How 
confident do you feel (e.g. Anne) was when 
stating her opinions?" on 7-point scales (1= not 
at all, 7= very much). The final questionnaire 
item asked participants to provide their ethnic 
background. When the study was over, 
participants were thanked for their participation 
and debriefed about the experiment. Following 
the debriefing, the experimenter asked them 
whether they noticed an accent in the audio-
discussion or not (only for those in the accent 
condition), whether they understood the PD 
game instructions or not, and whether they had 
any suspicions about the study during the 
experiment or not. 
Results 
Manipulation check 
All participants assigned to the accent 
condition reported that they noticed accent in the 
audio-discussion. In the non-accent (control) 
condition, participants perceived 'Anne' and 
`Lynn' as relatively more similar to themselves 
(M= 4.07, SD = 1.21) than 'Kim' and 'Sue' 
(M= 3.68, SD = 1.28), however, the mean 
difference was not significant (p = .24). In the 
accent condition, participants perceived 'Anne' 
and 'Lynn,' who were the in-group members in 
terms of their nationality, significantly more 
similar to themselves (M= 5.29, SD = 1.24) than 
`Kim' and 'Sue,' who were the out-group 
members (M= 2.76, SD = 1.25, t (49) = 7.64, 
p <.001). Confidence level of `Kim,' Sue,' and 
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`Lynn,' which was perceived by participants 
from the audio discussion respectively, did not 
differ across conditions. Although the exact same 
audio was used for the part of 'Anne,' she was 
perceived to be more confident in the accent 
condition (M= 5.76) than the control condition 
(M= 5.12, t (97) = 2.31,p <.05). 
PD game response 
The cooperative response A was computed as 
1 and the competitive response B was computed 
as 2. The mean difference in PD game response 
between the accent and control conditions was 
compared by t test and it was not significant 
(Mccent = 1.46 vs Mcontrol = 1.57,p >.20). 
Bonus money allocation 
The mean difference in the amount of money 
allocated to participants themselves was 
compared by t test across conditions and it was 
not significant (Maccent = 62.40 vs Meo.„0, = 57.76, 
p >.20). None of the results obtained from the 
bonus money allocation task were significant. 
Depersonalization of self and others 
1) Depersonalization of others 
a) Implicit measurement: Who said what 
Accuracy. The mean accuracy of all 99 
participants for the recall test "Who said what" 
was 46%, and it was statistically higher than 
25%, the chance accuracy rate (M= .46, 
SD = .17, t (98) = 12.18, p <.001). Participants in 
the accent condition were marginally more 
accurate than participants in the non-accent 
condition (M 
accent = '49, SD = .16 vs Mcontrol = -43, 
 
SD = .18, t (97) = 1.91,p <.10). 
Intra-group errors. Total errors consisted of 
intra-group errors and inter-group errors. Intra-
group errors represented participants' memory 
confusion between 'Anne' and `Lynn' and 
between 'Kim' and 'Sue.' Inter-group errors 
represented confusion between the other pairs of 
the four females: {Anne and Kim}, {Anne and 
Sue}, {Kim and Lynn}, and {Sue and Lynn} . 
Thus, by chance, inter-group errors could be 
twice more likely to be made than intra-group 
errors by each participant. Since the accuracy  
rate was not equal across conditions, a mean 
percentage of intra-group errors in total errors 
(i.e. the total number of intra-group errors 
divided by the total number of errors) was 
computed for each condition and compared. The 
mean percentage of intra-group errors among 
participants in the accent condition was 76%, 
and it was significantly higher than 33%, the 
percentage of intra-group errors by chance 
(M= .76, SD = .17, t (49) = 17.93,p <.001). The 
mean percentage of intra-group errors among 
participants in the non-accent condition was 
54%, and it was also significantly higher than 
33% (M= .54, SD = .27, t (48) = 5.31,p <.001). 
Therefore, participants in both conditions 
showed a significant level of depersonalization 
measured by the types of errors in the recall test. 
However, as expected, the mean percentage of 
intra-group errors made by participants in the 
accent condition was significantly higher than 
the non-accent condition (t (97) = 4.77,p <.001). 
An ANOVA, which compared the number of 
intra-group errors across conditions, controlling 
the total number of errors, yielded the same 
result (F = 12.65,p <.001). Therefore, 
participants in the accent condition were more 
greatly confused between the same group 
members, recalling what they said, compared to 
participants in the non-accent condition. In other 
words, participants in the accent condition 
showed higher depersonalization of others, the 
four females in the audio-discussion, than 
participants in the control condition. 
b) Explicit measurement: Intra-group 
variability 
i) Perceived similarity within a group. As 
predicted, participants in the accent condition 
perceived the same group members, {Anne and 
Lynn} and {Kim and Sue}, significantly more 
similar to each other than participants in the non-
accent condition (Maccent= 5.45, SD = 1.10 vs 
Mcontroi = 4.60, SD = 1.34, t (97) = 3.43,p <.005). 
Perceived similarity within a group increased 
due to the presence of salient out-group 
membership (see Figure 4). 
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ii) Perceived similarity between groups. As 
predicted, participants in the accent condition 
perceived the different group members, {Anne 
and Kim}, {Anne and Sue}, {Kim and Lynn}, 
and {Sue and Lynn}, significantly less similar to 
each other than participants in the non-accent 
condition (Maccent = 2.99, SD = .98 vs 
Mcontrol = 3.43, SD = .80, t (97) = -2.45,p <.05). 
Perceived similarity between groups diminished 
due to the presence of salient out-group 
membership (see Figure 4). Together (1b(i) and 
(ii)), participants in the accent condition showed 
higher depersonalization of others than 
participants in the non-accent condition. 
2) Depersonalization of self 
i) Perceived similarity between self and in-
group members (`Anne' and 'Lynn). Participants 
in the accent condition perceived themselves 
significantly more similar to 'Anne' and 'Lynn,' 
in-group members, than participants in the non- 
accent condition 	
ccent (M 	 = 5.29, SD = 1.24 vs a 
Mcontrol = 4.07, SD = 1.21, t (97) = 4.95, p <.001). 
Perceived similarity between self and in-group 
members increased due to the accent of out-
group members as expected (see Figure 5). 
ii) Perceived similarity between self and out-
group members (`ICim' and `Sue ). Participants in 
the accent condition perceived themselves 
significantly less similar to 'Kim' and 'Sue,' out-
group members, than participants in the non-
accent condition (M 
accent= 2.76, SD = 1.25 vs 
Mcontmi = 3.68, SD = 1.28, t (97) = -3.61, 
p <.001). Perceived dissimilarity between self 
and out-group members increased due to the 
accent as predicted (see Figure 5). Therefore, 
(from 2(i) and (ii)), participants in the accent 
condition showed higher depersonalization of 
self than participants in the non-accent condition. 
Therefore, all of the methods used to measure 
levels of depersonalization showed that 
participants in the accent condition 
depersonalized self and others more greatly than 
participants in the non-accent (control) condition 
as expected and that the effects were significant. 
Correlations among these methods were 
computed (see Table 1). A percentage of intra- 
group errors, perceived similarity within a group, 
and perceived similarity between groups, all of 
which measured depersonalization of others, 
were significantly correlated with each other 
(p < .001). The first two measures were 
positively correlated (r = .57, p <.001), and the 
first and third measures (r = -.51, p <.001) and 
the last two explicit measures (r =.-63, p <.001) 
were negatively correlated. Also, perceived 
similarity between self and in-group members 
and perceived similarity between self and out-
group members, which measured 
depersonalization of self, were negatively 
correlated (r = -.76, p < .001). The implicit 
measurement using a percentage of intra-group 
errors was also significantly correlated with the 
measurement for depersonalization of self 
(r = .43,p .001; r = -.35, p <.001). 
Effects of Depersonalization on PD game 
The effects of depersonalization as well as the 
accent manipulation on the PD game responses 
were examined. Given that the accent 
manipulation had no overall effects on the PD 
game responses as noted, my original plan to 
examine the mediating role of depersonalization 
became inappropriate. Instead, a median-split 
analysis using a Univariate ANOVA was applied. 
Participants were split by the median of the 
depersonalization scores measured with a 
percentage of intra-group errors in "Who said 
what." Participants whose depersonalization 
scores were higher than the median (i.e. % intra-
group errors > .72, N = 50) were classified as 
high-depersonalization individuals, who greatly 
depersonalized the four females in the audio-
discussion. Participants whose depersonalization 
scores were equal to or lower than the median 
(i.e. % intra-group errors < .72, N = 49) were 
classified as low-depersonalization individuals. 
A univariate ANOVA was performed to 
investigate how the high or low level of 
depersonalization and the accent or non-accent 
manipulation affected participants' PD game 
responses, respectively. The results are 
summarized in Table 2. High-depersonalization 
individuals significantly made more competitive 
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PD game responses than low-depersonalization 
individuals as predicted (Mhigh = 1.68 vs 
Mow= 1.35, F (1) = 19.95, p < .001), when the 
effect of the accent manipulation was collapsed. 
On the other hand, when the effect of 
depersonalization was collapsed, the effect of the 
accent manipulation on PD game responses 
became significant in an unpredicted direction. 
Participants in the accent condition made more 
cooperative PD game responses than those in the 
non-accent (control) condition (Maccem = 1.46 vs 
Mcontroi = 1.57, F (1) = 8.23,p < .01). There was 
no significant interaction between the level of 
depersonalization and the accent manipulation. 
We also carried out a regression analysis for the 
type of PD game response, specifying the accent 
manipulation and the level of depersonalization 
as independent variables, and confirmed the 
same results. The coefficient of the accent 
manipulation was significant and showed that 
the accent condition led participants to act more 
cooperatively in the PD game than the non-
accent condition = -.29, SD = .11, p <.05). 
The coefficient of depersonalization was also 
significant and showed that higher 
depersonalization led to more competitive PD 
game responses = .519, SD = .25, p <.05). The 
interaction between the two independent 
variables in the regression was not significant. 
The effects of depersonalization of self and 
others measured with the other methods were 
examined by the median-split analysis with a 
univariate ANOVA as well. Only 
depersonalization of self, which was measured 
with perceived similarity between self and out-
group members, showed a significant effect in a 
predicted direction. Higher perceived 
dissimilarity between self and out-group 
members, i.e. higher depersonalization of self, 
led to more competitive responses in the PD 
game (Mhigh = 1.60 vs Mow 1.43, F (1) = 5.25, 
p < .05). The accent manipulation had a 
marginally significant effect on the types of PD 
game responses when the effect of 
depersonalization of self was collapsed, and also 
unexpectedly, participants in the accent condition 
showed a higher level of cooperation than  
participants in the non-accent condition 
(Maccent = 1.46 vs Mcontro, = 1.57, F (1) = 3.46, 
p < .10). There was no interaction between the 
accent manipulation and the level of 
depersonalization of self. 
Sex difference 
In the non-accent condition, male participants 
were relatively competitive in the PD game 
(M= 1.78, SD = .42, n = 23), while females were 
relatively cooperative (M= 1.38, SD = .50, 
n = 26). The sex difference in the types of the PD 
game responses in the control condition was 
significant (t (47) = -3.00,p < .005). Also, the 
control male participants made many more intra-
group errors relative to inter-group errors in the 
recall test "Who said what" (a percentage of 
intra-group errors M= .63, SD = .25) and 
showed higher depersonalization of the four 
females in the audio-discussion than the control 
female participants (M= .46, SD = .28, 
t (47) = -2.26,p <.05). No significant sex 
differences appeared in the accent condition. 
Miscellaneous 
There were no participants who had 
suspicions about the purpose of the experiment 
which could have harmfully affected the results. 
The results described above were based on 
the data of all 99 participants. I did a 
supplementary data analysis after excluding two 
participants who did not understand the PD game 
instructions and including only participants who 
indicated their ethnic background as Caucasian. 
There were 86 participants (44 participants in the 
accent condition and 42 participants in the 
control condition) left for the supplementary 
analysis, but it did not yield any conceptually 
different results from the results that included all 
participants. 
Discussion 
The present study examined how individuals 
would behave differently toward their opponent 
in a PD game when it was apparent that the 
opponent belonged to a different group from 
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theirs (i.e. an out-group) in terms of nationality, 
compared to when such a cue was absent. 
Accented English was used for the manipulation, 
and it provided participants with a salient 
indication of their opponent's out-group 
membership in the PD game. Due to the salient 
out-group membership, it was expected that 
perceived inter-group categorization would be 
greater and that participants would depersonalize 
self and others more, that is, perceive self and 
others as group members rather than unique 
individuals (Postmes et al., 2002; Turner, 1987; 
Van Prooijen & Van Knippenberg, 2000). It was 
hypothesized that a higher level of 
depersonalization would lead individuals to 
behave more competitively in a situation where 
they were inclined to win a big monetary award 
such as in the last trial of the PD game in the 
experiment. Because of the expected effects of 
depersonalization, it was expected that 
participants who received the salient indication 
of the opponent's out-group membership by her 
foreign accent would get more competitive (as 
opposed to cooperative) toward her in the PD 
game and allocate more bonus money to 
themselves than participants who did not hear 
the foreign accent. 
As predicted, the results showed that 
participants who heard the foreign accent in the 
accent condition depersonalized self and others 
more greatly than participants who only heard a 
native accent in the control condition. Moreover, 
when the effect of the accent manipulation was 
collapsed by a univariate ANOVA, a higher level 
of depersonalization of self and others, which 
were measured with perceived similarity 
between self and out-group members and the 
types of recall errors respectively, was strongly 
associated with higher competitiveness in the PD 
game. On the other hand, the accent 
manipulation did not have significant effects on 
the types of the PD game responses until the 
effect of depersonalization was controlled. When 
the effect of depersonalization was collapsed by 
a univariate ANOVA, it was shown that the 
presence of the foreign accent in the accent 
condition unexpectedly increased participants'  
cooperation in the PD game. Together, the results 
suggested that some distinct process(es) other 
than depersonalization also arose from the 
presence of the foreign accent and affected the 
nature of the PD game responses in a direction 
opposite from the way depersonalization affected 
it. For instance, we can infer that the foreign 
accent made participants aware that the opponent 
`Kim' was a foreigner and activated their self-
presentational concerns with social desirability 
(e.g. "I would not do something unfavorable to a 
foreigner, not me."). As a result, the presence of 
the foreign accent might have not only led 
participants to depersonalize self and others but 
also to become nicer toward the opponent 'Kim' 
and thus more cooperative. Thus, when the effect 
of depersonalization was not collapsed, it was 
most likely that more than one process, which 
worked in opposite directions in an additive 
manner, made the overall effects that the accent 
manipulation had on the PD game responses 
null. 
The prior research that used the minimum 
group paradigm indicated salience of inter-group 
categorization had a direct effect on the level of 
in-group favoritism (Brewer, 1979; Turner, 
1985). In the present study, the groups were 
distinguished by a social enduring category (e.g. 
nationality), and it differed from the minimum 
group paradigm, where groups were temporarily 
and arbitrarily created in a laboratory. The 
present study manipulated salience of out-group 
membership and assumed that salient out-group 
membership would increase perceived inter-
group categorization. It directly examined the 
effects of depersonalization of self and others on 
the PD game and demonstrated that inter-group 
categorization led to in-group favoritism in terms 
of increased competitiveness toward an out-
group member when depersonalization of self 
and others was heightened. 
No significant results were obtained from the 
bonus money allocation task that was performed 
following the PD game. The majority of 
participants allocated about half of the bonus 
money, that was worth U.S. $100 in total, to 
themselves in both conditions and it might have 
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reflected their fairness concern. Since 
participants were repeatedly told by the 
instructions that the entire situation was 
hypothetical, their relatively low involvement 
could have been another reason for the null 
effects. 
While the various methods that measured 
depersonalization of self and others mostly 
worked, the implicit measurement "Who said 
what" (Postmes et al., 2002; Taylor et al., 1978), 
which used participants' memory confusion 
within a group (i.e. intra-group errors) as a 
depersonalization score, turned out to be 
particularly useful to measure the level of 
depersonalization of others. It was highly 
correlated with all the other measures for 
depersonalization of self and others. Participants, 
who made many more intra-group errors relative 
to inter-group errors and thus showed higher 
depersonalization of the four females they 
listened to, were more competitive in the PD 
game. Moreover, male participants in the non-
accent condition were more competitive in the 
PD game than female participants in the same 
condition, and also showed higher level of 
depersonalization measured with a percentage of 
intra-group errors, although this is a post hoc 
explanation. 
The present study only used an Asian accent 
for the manipulation. In the accent condition, 
therefore, the difference in the four females' 
attitudes toward premarital sex was consistent 
with an existent stereotype about the two social 
groups, which is confirmed by some statistical 
evidence (Okazaki, 2002; Tan, 2004). Although 
the extent to which their attitudes differed was 
held constant across conditions, it is possible that 
not only the accent but also the consistency of 
the content of their speech with the existent 
stereotypes about Asian and American females in 
the accent condition promoted depersonalization 
among participants more easily than the non-
accent condition. An accent of a different origin 
or various combinations of different scenarios 
could be used to extend the findings. 
Future work should also investigate group 
stereotypes, which probably increased with  
depersonalization of self and others. Postmes et 
al. (2002) found that depersonalized interaction 
increased perceived inter-group differentiation 
and negative stereotypes toward an out-group. 
The present study did not demonstrate whether 
negative stereotypes toward an out-group 
member were activated when depersonalization 
was heightened, or how they directly or 
indirectly affected the PD game responses. 
Also, the present study did not directly 
measure (an) opposing force(s), which arose 
from the accent manipulation and increased 
participants' cooperation toward an out-group 
member in the PD game. It would be important 
to investigate in the future what these factors are 
(e.g. social desirability, politeness, niceness, etc) 
and when they work strongly against 
depersonalization. As every individual did not 
equally depersonalize the four females by 
listening to them in the experiment, we can 
expect that there will be individual differences in 
the extent, to which they would become self-
concerned with their own reactions toward out-
group members. 
The results of the present study showed that 
the mere presence of the foreign accent 
heightened depersonalization of self and others, 
and that elevated depersonalization increased 
individuals' competitiveness toward an out-
group member even in the hypothetical setting in 
the laboratory, where they did not expect to 
receive the real money. Although many of us are 
watchful of our own reactions to a person who 
belongs to a different social group from ours, it 
seems rather hard to avoid depersonalization, 
through which we perceive the person as "one of 
them." The more obvious the out-group 
membership is, the harder it gets to control it, 
and our depersonalized perception would lead to 
more exploitative behavior in interaction with 
the out-group. 
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Table 1 
Correlations Between Depersonalization Measures 
1. Depersonalization of others 
a. Implicit measurement "who said what," i.e. a percentage of intra-group errors 
b. Explicit measurement: intra-group variability 
i) Perceived similarity within a group 
ii) Perceived similarity between groups 
2. Depersonalization of self 
i) Perceived similarity between self and in-group members 
ii) Perceived similarity between self and out-group members 
N=99 
Measures 	 1 a 	 lb(i) 	 lb(ii) 	 2(i) 	 2(ii) 
la 	 .568** 	 -.505** 	 .425** 	 -.350** 
lb(i) 	 -.652** 	 .203* 	 -.188(p<.10) 
lb(ii) 	 -- 	 -.227* 	 .256* 
2(i) 	 -.764** 
2(ii) 
Note. ** Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level, p<.001 (2-tailed) 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level, p<.05 (2-tailed) 
Table 2 




Non-Accent 	 Total 
     
     
Depersonalization PD response n SD PD response n SD PD response n SD 
High 	 1.63 	 35 .49 	 1.80 	 15 .41 	 1.68 	 50 .47 
Low 	 1.07 	 15 .26 	 1.47 	 34 .51 	 1.35 	 49 .48 
Total 	 1.46 	 50 .50 	 1.57 	 49 .50 	 1.52 	 99 .50 
Note. The cooperative PD game response A was computed as 1, and the competitive 
response B was computed as 2. Higher value of `PD response' indicates that participants 
behaved more competitively in the PD game. 
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Figure I. Choice matrix of prisoner's dilemma (PD) game shown to participants 
Kim chooses 
A 
$100, $100 $10, $500 




(The amount of money you will get is expressed in bold on the left in each cell, while the amount of money Kim will 
get is expressed on the right in each cell.) 
If you choose A and Kim chooses A, you will get $100 and Kim will get $100 (left cell at the top). 
If you choose A and Kim chooses B, you will get $10 and Kim will get $500 (the right cell at the top). 
If you choose B and Kim chooses A, you will get $500 and Kim will get $10 (the left cell at the bottom). 
If you choose B and Kim chooses B, you will get $15 and Kim will get $15 (the right cell at the bottom). 
Figure 2. History of the PD game responses told to participants 
Kim chooses  
A 
A 
You choose  
 
B 
In the first two trials, both of you chose B, and therefore you two earned $15 respectively, which is indicated 
by the line-shaded cell (the right at the bottom) in the matrix. 
On the last four trials, both of you chose A, and therefore you two earned $100 respectively, which is indicated 
by the dot-shaded cell (the left at the top) in the matrix. 
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Figure 3. Choice matrix of bonus money allocation shown to participants 
Kim Kim Kim Kim Kim Kim Kim Kim Kim Kim Kim 
$100 $90 $80 $70 $60 $50 $40 $30 $20 $10 $0 
$0 $10 $20 $30 $40 $50 $60 $70 $80 $90 $100 
You You You You You You You You You You You 






















i) Between Self and In-group 	 ii) Between Self and Out-group 
5.29 
Figure 5. Depersonalization of self: Perceived similarity between self and in-group or out-group 
members 
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